The effect of husband-wife communication on marital power in decision-making by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Weeks, Melvin O'Neal
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This dissertation was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. 
While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this 
document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of 
the original submitted. 
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction. 
1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the 
missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with 
adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and 
duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity. 
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black 
mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the 
copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred 
image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame. 
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being 
photographed the photographer followed a definite method in 
"sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the 
upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from 
left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, 
sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and 
continuing on until complete. 
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest 
value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be 
made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the 
dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at 
additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog 
number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced. 
University Microfilms 
300 North Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 
A Xerox Education Company 
73-6163 
WEEKS, Melvin O'Neal, 1937-
THE EFFECT OF HUSBAND-WIFE COMMUNICATION ON 
MARITAL POWER IN DECISION-MAKING. 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 
Ph.D., 1973 
Social Psychology 
University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan 
© 1972 
MELVIN O'NEAL WEEKS 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
THE EFFECT OF HUSBAND-WIFE COMMUNICATION 
ON MARITAL POWER 1"N 
DECISION-MAKING 
by 
Melvin O'Neal Weeks 
A Dissertation Submitted to 
the Faculty of the Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Greensboro 
June, 1972 
Approved by 
Dissertation Adviser 
APPROVAL PAGE 
This dissertation has been approved by the 
following committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School 
at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro. 
Dissertation 
Adviser 
Oral Examination 
Committee Members 
/ '  f i n  f / / 
f  • '// I  7 r /V 
^ '/JJ, t-
June 23. 1972 
Date of Examination 
ii 
PLEASE NOTE: 
Some pages may have 
indistinct print. 
Filmed as received. 
University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company 
WEEKS, MELVIN O'NEAL. The Effect of Husband-Wife 
Communication on Marital Power in Decision-Making. (197%) 
Directed by: Dr. Richard H. Klemer. Pp. 91. 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the 
effect of husband-wife communication on marital power in 
decision-making. Forty married couples were selected from 
the parents of children enrolled in the School of Home 
Economics Nursery School program at the University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro. The subjects were selected 
on the basis of their homogeneity of characteristics 
related to variables which had been reported by previous 
research to affect marital power. Couples were randomly 
assigned to an experimental and a control group. A 
Decision Power Index was used as a measure of each spouse's 
perceived power. A pretest and a posttest, both of which 
consisted of the same risk-taking decision, were administered 
to each spouse before and after a fifteen-minute period 
during which the experimental couples discussed the 
decision and the control couples listened to an unrelated 
musical tape and had no communication. Appropriate £ tests 
were used to analyze the data. The significance level was 
set at the .05 critical value for a two-tailed test. 
Hypothesis one, that the husbands and wives in the 
experimental group would make significantly greater progress 
toward consensus in the decision-making task than the 
husbands and wives in the control group, was rejected even 
though the experimental couples made significant progress 
toward consensus and the control couples did not. The 
second hypothesis, that on the posttest the mean of the 
difference between the responses of the husbands and wives 
in the control group would be significantly larger than 
the mean of the difference between the responses of the 
husbands and wives in the experimental group, was also 
rejected. The third hypothesis predicted that the mean of 
the scores of the husbands on the pretest would show 
significantly greater risk-taking than the mean of the 
scores of the wives on the pretest. The data supported 
this hypothesis. 
Fourthly, it was hypothesized that for the 
experimental group the posttest responses would be more in 
the direction of the pretest response of the spouse who 
was perceived by the husband as more powerful in the self-
report of power. Hypothesis four was accepted. When the 
same test was applied to the spouse who was perceived as 
more powerful by the wife the data were non-supportive. 
Hypothesis five, that since the risk-taking decision 
involved the husband's occupation the husbands in the 
experimental group would exercise greater influence than 
the wives on the decision, was also accepted. Furthermore, 
when hypotheses four and five were applied to the control 
group they were further supported by the data from the 
control group. 
Hypotheses six and seven predicted that the spouse 
who talked more frequently (6) and the spouse who talked 
more total time (7) would exercise greater power on the 
posttest response than the spouse who talked less 
f r e q u e n t l y  ( 6 )  a n d  t h e  s p o u s e  w h o  t a l k e d  l e s s  t o t a l  t i m e  ( 7 ) .  
There was a tendency toward the predicted outcome for both 
hypotheses, but the difference was not statistically 
significant for either. Therefore, both were rejected. 
The major conclusions were: 
1. While husband-wife communication has a tendency 
to affect marital power in decision-making, the dynamics 
of marital power are such that they affect decision-making, 
especially for the less powerful spouse, even when there 
is no interspousal communication about a specific decision. 
2. Husbands are more willing to take risks in 
decisions concerning their occupations and income than 
their wives who are more conservative with regard to such 
decisions. 
3. Husbands' assessments of the marital power 
structure are more accurate than wives' assessments. 
U. Both husbands and wives more often perceive 
husbands as more powerful. 
5. Husbands are more powerful in decisions related 
to their occupations. 
6. The spouse who talks more during husband-wife 
communication tends to have greater influence in decision 
making. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The many changes in the family in recent years 
have been the subjects of much research and literature in 
the family field of study. Blood and Wolfe (i960) believed 
that no change had been discussed more often and that 
perhaps no change in the family had been more significant 
than the change in the marital power structure. There has 
been a shift from the one-sided male authoritarian structure 
to the sharing of marital power by husbands and wives. The 
importance of marital power is emphasized by the fact that 
it not only is affected by many aspects of the marital 
relationship, but it also affects most other aspects of 
the relationship. "The balance of power between husband 
and wife is a sensitive reflection of the roles they play 
in marriage—and, in turn, has many repercussions on other 
aspects of their relationship (Blood and Wolfe, 1960, 
P. 11)." 
Another aspect which has been the focus of much 
family literature in recent years is family communication. 
One of the primary goals of communication is to persuade 
or influence others. Aristotle defined the study of 
communication as the search for all available means of 
persuasion. Since Aristotle the concept of communication 
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has gone through many definitions and conceptual changes. 
However, in recent years the behavioral communication 
theorist has returned to a definition of communication 
very close to that of Aristotle (Berlo, i960). 
Berlo believed that all use of language has a 
persuasive element in it. One cannot communicate at all 
without some attempt to persuade or influence, in one way 
or another. 
What one person says or does in the presence of 
another person is a function of what the first thinks 
will produce in the second a frame of mind or attitude 
that will increase the probability that the second 
will do as the first wishes—e.g., that the behavior 
of the second will conform to the first's version of 
what the future ought to be like (Berlo, 1966, p. 36). 
The Aristotlean definition of communication as the search 
for "all available means of persuasion" finds further 
support in tfatzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson who went so far 
as to say that all forms of behavior are attempts to 
communicate, that the behavior of each family member is 
related to and dependent on the behavior of all other family 
members and, therefore, all behavior (as communication) 
influences others and is influenced by others. 
In their book, Mirages of Marriage. Lederer and 
Jackson (1968), stated that marital communication is a 
constant exchange of messages between the husband and wife 
by speech, writing and the use of bodily and facial 
expressions, as well as by other methods. Everything which 
one spouse does in relation to the other spouse is a form 
of communication. "There is no not communicating. Even 
silence is communication (p. 99)•" 
Campbell and Hepler (1966) began the general 
introduction to their book, Dimensions in Communication, by-
stating that 
this book takes as one of its major premises the 
belief that all communication is persuasive. The 
importance of persuasion may vary among situations, 
but persuasion is always present to some degree 
(.P • 1) • 
Problem Statement and Purpose of the Study 
If communication is an attempt to persuade or 
influence, will husband-wife communication have a 
significant effect on their use of marital power in a 
decision-making situation? This study was an attempt to 
measure the relationship between husband-wife communication 
and the extent to which they influence each other's 
decision-making, as measured by their responses to a 
decision-making task before and after communication. 
The primary purpose of the study was to relate 
these two family phenomena—communication and marital power-
to ascertain if the use of the latter is effected by the 
former. A secondary purpose was to compare the perceived 
power of husbands and wives, as measured by a Decision-
Power Index (Appendix B), with their actual power, as 
u 
measured by their influence on each other's response to a 
risk-taking decision (Appendix C). 
Definitions 
For the purposes stated in this study, the following 
definitions were used. 
Marital power is the ability of one person in the 
marital dyad to influence or control the other person's 
choices and/or behavior. Influence is the degree to which 
formal or informal, overt or covert pressure which is 
exerted by one member of the dyad on the other is successful 
in imposing the former's viewpoint about a pending decision 
on the latter (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970). In this study 
one's power was measured by the extent to which he main­
tained his initial position on a decision and by the 
extent to which his spouse's initial position was changed 
to more closely approximate his initial position as a 
result of their discussion of the decision. 
Perceived marital power refers to each spouse's 
perception of the extent to which he influences decision­
making in his marriage. Each spouse's perception of his 
marital power was measured by a self-report response to a 
questionnaire designed to measure perceived marital power 
(see Appendix B). This instrument, which was adapted from 
a larger questionnaire by Blood (1967) and which was used 
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with his permission, will be discussed in more detail in 
the methodology section of this paper. 
Actual marital power refers to the extent to which 
one spouse influences the decision of the other as 
objectively measured by a comparison of the pretest and 
posttest scores of couples1 responses to a risk-taking 
decision (see Appendix C). The spouse who moved less in 
the direction of the other spouse than the other spouse 
moved in his direction was defined as having greater 
actual marital power than his spouse. 
Husband-wife communication is the verbal and non­
verbal behavior in which couples engage when they interact 
in response to a decision-making task. However, for this 
study, only the verbal behavior of the dyad was measured, 
and only the amount and frequency of verbal communication 
in which each spouse engaged was measured. 
A risk-taking decision is a decision in which one 
takes a chance on losing something in order to increase 
his chances of gaining something better. The risk-taking 
decision to which the couples in this study were asked to 
make a response was a hypothetical situation in which they 
decided between a less attractive, but more secure job and 
a superior, more attractive, but less secure job for the 
husband (see Appendix C). Thus, a risk-taking decision 
"involves choosing between a more certain less attractive 
6 
alternative and a less certain more attractive alternative 
(Brown, 1965, p. 6 5 8 ) . "  
Limitations of the Study 
This study has several limitations of which the 
reader should be aware. Por one thing, there are so many 
variables related to marital power and decision-making that 
it would have been unrealistic to have attempted to measure 
all of them, especially using an experimental design and a 
limited number of subjects. Therefore, this study focused 
primarily on husband-wife communication as the independent 
variable, marital power as the dependent variable and 
decision-making as the measure of marital power. An 
attempt was made to control as many of the other variables 
affecting marital power as possible. 
Another limitation of the study is the atypicalness 
of the population from which the sample was drawn. The 
population consisted of the parents of children enrolled 
in the School of Home Economics Nursery School at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Many of these 
parents are in professional occupations, and most of them 
rank above the average population in the United States in 
level of education and income. It is obvious then that the 
possibilities for drawing inferences from the findings of 
this study are quite limited. 
The decision-making problem used in this study-
involved a hypothetical decision regarding the husband's 
occupation and related economic implications. Therefore, 
no inference can be made that the spouse who emerged as 
more powerful in this study would also emerge as more 
powerful if some other type of decision were involved. 
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CHAPTER XI 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Due to the amount of research on marital power 
which has been conducted and reported in the literature, 
an exhaustive review of the literature would be 
impractical. The attempt has been rather to make the 
review of literature for this study representative of the 
research which has been done on marital power. 
While an abundance of research studies of the 
marital power structure in the United States and abroad 
have been conducted in recent years, the majority of these 
have been based on the self-reports of wives, which means 
that they have actually dealt 'with the perception of the 
marital power structure held by only one member of the 
marital dyad. Attempts to justify this approach have been 
based on the assumptions that there is agreement between 
spouses' perceptions of the marital power structure and 
that there is agreement between spouses' perceptions of 
the marital power structure and their actual power 
structure (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970). Blood and Wolfe 
(i960) attempted to defend their use of the wife's report 
of marital power as a valid measuring by stating that while 
there are no doubt individual cases where the husband would 
give a different report of marital power from that of his 
9 
wife, these differences tend to "get lost in the shuffle 
when large numbers of cases are considered (p. 123)." 
Contrary to the assumed agreement between marital 
power as perceived by husbands and wives, in those studies 
where both husbands and wives have been interviewed some 
significant discrepancies have been reported between 
husbands' and wives' perceptions of marital power (Brown 
and Rutter, 1 9 6 6 }  Burchinal and Bauder, 1 9 6 5 ;  Heer, 1 9 6 2 ;  
Safilios-Rothschild, 1969} Scanzoni, 1965} Wilkening and 
Morrison, 1963). 
In comparing the perceived and actual power of 
married couples, Olson (1968) found no significant 
relationship between the measures of predicted (perceived) 
power and actual power. When there was incongruence between 
perceived and actual power, the husbands' predictions 
maximized their actual power and the wives' predictions 
minimized their actual power. 
Turk and Bell (1972), in an attempt to test for the 
intrafamily reliability of a self-report of marital power, 
included Blood and Wolfe's (i960) eight items in their 
questionnaire. Their data showed that when the husbands 
and wives were treated as matched pairs the differences 
between their scores were significant at the .03 level. 
There was a tendency for each spouse in their study to under-
report his own power and to overreport his spouse's power. 
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Heer (1963)1 in a study of husband and wife 
perceptions of the family power structure among 1J8 Catholic 
families in the metropolitan area of Boston, found that 
wives have more power than wives are likely to claim for 
themselves. He concluded that the husband's assessment of 
the power structure in any marriage is likely to be more 
accurate than that of his wife. 
That marital power is a variable which is affected 
by many factors in the marital relationship is supported 
by a number of studies. In their study of 731 Detroit 
families, Blood and Wolfe (i960) found that the higher the 
husband's occupational prestige and level of income, the 
greater his marital power. Their findings also supported 
the hypothesis that the higher either spouse's educational 
level and age in relation to the other spouse, the greater 
his or her power is likely to be. Those wives who were 
employed outside the home exercised more marital power than 
did those wives who were not employed outside the home. 
Ninety percent of the couples Blood and Wolfe studied 
indicated that the husband always made the decisions 
concerning the husband's job, and four percent more 
indicated that the decision was made by the husband more 
than by the wife. These researchers also concluded that 
the longer the couple had been married, the more power the 
wife had and the less power the husband had. They found 
1 1  
that the husband's power increased from the honeymoon 
period to the period when the couple had young children 
and that the husband's power declined gradually through 
the subsequent stages of the family life cycle into the 
"post-parental" stage, after which his power decreased 
sharply at the husband's retirement from employment. 
Hill (1965) used data collected as a part of the 
Minnesota Consumership Study of an intergenerational 
sample to study marital power across the family life cycle. 
He treated the data from the youngest of the three 
generations as representative of the early stages of the 
family life cycle, the data from the parent generation as 
representative of the middle stages and the grandparent 
generation's data as representative of the later stages of 
the family life cycle. Hill's data were gathered by means 
of questionnaires, interviews and direct observations of 
the couples. The data from the interviewers' reports 
indicated a decrease in husband dominance from the early 
stages and an increase in wife dominance into the last 
stage of the family life cycle. The observers' reports 
showed much less equalitarianism and significantly more 
wife-centered decision-making in all three generations 
than did the subjects' self-reports. 
Michel (7967)$ in a cross-cultural comparison of 
the interaction in French and American families, found 
1 2  
that in both countries the husband's voice in marital 
decisions was positively correlated with his educational 
level and his occupational prestige. His findings also 
indicated that when the wife worked outside the home her 
power increased and her husband's decreased. Those wives 
who had achieved a greater educational level than their 
husbands had more decision-making power than those wives 
who had less education than their husbands. Based on her 
study of "Blue-Collar Marriages," Komarovsky reported the 
following: 
The relative educational attainment of the spouses 
was found to affect their degrees of power. Of 36 
husbands whose education is at least equal (or 
superior) to that of their wives, 21 enjoy superior 
power. But there are only 5 dominant men among the 
18 husbands with less formal schooling than their 
wives (1962, p. 229). 
Sirles (1970)  found, in a study of the power structure in 
military families, that when the husband's income level 
increased, his power increased. 
The findings of a study by Centers (1971) support 
the relationship between the husband's marital power and 
his educational level and occupational prestige. He also 
found that the husband's power decreased with the duration 
of the marriage, and his power was likely to be greater in 
the first marriage for both spouses than if either spouse 
had been married before. 
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Davis ( l 9 7 l )  conducted a study of marital roles in 
decisions related to consumer purchases and reported that: 
(1) the longer a couple had been married, the more the 
wife's power tended to increase and the husband's to 
decrease; (2) wives who worked outside the home exercised 
significantly more power than those wives not employed 
outside the home; (3) the wife's power increased and the 
husband's decreased if she had the same or more education 
than he; (U) wives with children living at home had less 
influence on decisions than those wives with no children 
living at home; (5) wives who held companionship attitudes 
about marital roles were more likely to have more influence 
than wives who did not hold companionship attitudes. 
In a study of the effects of the employment of 
married women on husband and wife roles, Kligler (195^0 
found that in her predominantly middle-class sample the 
working mothers had greater influence on family decisions 
regarding major purchases, loans, savings, and investments, 
than did the nonworking mothers. Lupri's study (1969) of 
authority patterns in West German families indicated that 
husbands whose wives were gainfully employed had much less 
power than those husbands whose wives were not gainfully 
employed. His data further showed that the husband's 
power decreased as his wife's contributions became equal 
in terms of educational level, income, organizational 
1U 
membership and work participation. Perrella and Waldman 
(1966) also found that if the wife is a secondary income 
provider in her family, she is more likely to have increased 
latitude in her decision-making. 
Hoffman ( i 9 6 0 )  reported that working mothers had 
more marital power than non-working mothers (significant 
at the .06 level), but that working mothers made fewer 
decisions regarding household tasks than non-working mothers 
while their husbands made significantly more decisions 
regarding household tasks. 
According to Middleton and Putney (i960), their 
data showed that non-working wives were more likely to 
dominate marital decision-making than were working wives 
except in the areas of purchasing and living standards. 
In these two areas they discovered no significant 
difference between the dominance in decision-making of 
working and non-working wives. 
Prom his study of the effects of age at marriage 
and spacing of children on marital power in a sample of 
Detroit marriages, Campbell (1968) reported the following: 
(1) Wives who married at an early age were characterized 
by less participation in social and child-oriented decision­
making, especially if they married prior to age eighteen. 
This disadvantage continued from the birth of the first 
child to the birth of the fourth child. (2) The shorter 
the time between marriage and the birth of the first child, 
the less power the wife had relative to her husband. (3) 
The wife's power inferiority tended to be greatest among 
women who were premaritally pregnant. (4) As family size 
increased, the balance of power between husbands and wives 
became more symmetrical with the wives making more social 
decisions and the husbands exercising more power on child-
oriented decisions. (5) The wider the spacing between the 
first and the last birth, the greater the wife's economic 
and social power tended to be. 
Safilios-Rothschild (1967) did a cross-cultural 
comparison of the marital power structure in Greece, Prance, 
and the United States. She reported that in Greece a 
husband's power is likely to be higher when the couple 
have no children and lower when children are born, whereas 
in Prance and the United States, the husband's power is 
likely to increase when children are born. In all three 
cultures the wife's employment, reportedly, is likely to 
increase her power and decrease the husband's power. In 
contrast to most of the studies in the United States which 
have dealt with the husband's educational, occupational, 
and salary levels, Safilios-Rothschild reported that in 
Greece the husband with a high educational level, skilled 
or professional occupation and high salary tends to have 
less rather than greater marital power. 
16 
Strodtbeck (1951) conducted one of the early-
marital power studies in which he found that Navaho wives 
and Mormon husbands tended to win in disagreements with 
their spouses and that Texan couples were more equalitarian 
in the distribution of disagreement outcomes. For this 
research he used the Revealed Differences Technique in 
which areas of disagreement are discovered through the use 
of a decision questionnaire and then couples are 
instructed to interact and reach a joint decision. From 
this research, Strodtbeck concluded that there are 
cultural differences which determine whether husband or 
wife makes most of the decisions, that in the dyadic 
relationship, including the husband-wife dyad, one or the 
other must be dominant, and that the spouse who talks most 
has the greatest influence in decision-making. After 
analyzing the couples' interaction over their revealed 
differences, Strodtbeck reported that among the 34 couples 
in his study the spouse who talked most won most of the 
decisions in 2k of the cases. 
A similar finding regarding the relationship between 
the amount of verbal communication a spouse engaged in and 
the amount of influence he exerted on the decision-making 
process was reported by Smock (1971)» He found that the 
spouse who communicated more (total time) and the spouse 
who communicated more frequently was likely to have more 
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relative marital power. However, the data from Kenkel's 
(1959) study of 25 married students with at least one 
child introduced another variable: one's score on the 
Traditional Family Ideology. The results of his research 
indicated that those wives who scored high on Traditional 
Authoritarian Submission (authoritarian husband-submissive 
wife) were more likely than others to do most of the 
talking but were less likely to have a high degree of 
influence on the marital decision-making. 
In a later study by Kenkel (196IA), in which 50 
married couples where the husband was a college student 
were asked to decide how to spend a gift of $300, he 
reported that when the husband and wife talked equally, 
they were more likely to choose wife and/or household 
items and they were less likely to choose items for the 
husband and children. Whereas when the husband did more 
of the total talking than his wife, the couple chose more 
items for the husband and children. 
Smith (1971) compared the effects of two different 
forms of communication, note passing and verbal communica­
tion, on marital power and decision-making. His subjects 
were 3-.Pers°n families who were presented with family-
related problems on which they were asked to reach a decision. 
One group communicated verbally and the other group passed 
notes. The communication and the power structure were more 
sharply differentiated in the verbal communication group. 
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In the note-passing group the volume of communication and 
the influence on the decision were more evenly distributed 
among all three family members. Also the perceived power 
structure of the families in the verbal discussion group 
corresponded more highly to the actual power structure 
than in the note-passing group. 
The race and socio-economic status of the couple 
is another factor which affects marital power. However, 
there appears to be little consistency in the literature 
regarding the relationship between race and socio-economic 
status as the independent variables and marital power as 
the dependent variable, as the following sampling of 
research results and conclusions demonstrates: Working-
class wives are more dominant in financial control than 
middle-class wives (Rainwater, Coleman, and Handel, 1 9 5 9 ) •  
The wife's degree of subordination is maximal in the lower 
class and minimal in the middle class, with upper-class 
wives falling between the two extremes (Davis, Gardner 
and Gardner, 19^1). Hampe (1970) found no significant 
relationship between social class and the marital power of 
the husband. The working-class wife is more likely to 
have more influence on family decision-making than the 
middle-class wife (Heer, 1958). 
Fortune (19^4) reported no significant differences 
between decision-making by Negro and white mothers in 
comparable social classes, and no significant differences 
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were found in the decision-making of lower- and middle-
class Negro mothers. After comparing the power structures 
of Negro and white families by socio-economic class, King 
(1964) concluded that the differences in power structure 
were not related in any consistent or significant way to 
the correlates of social class used in his study. 
Thus, one is left with no consistent findings on 
which to base a conclusion about the relationship between 
race, social class and marital power. 
Based on the above review of some of the literature 
related to marital power, the following variables appear 
to be among those significantly related to marital power, 
although the research findings are not always in agreement 
as to how these variables affect marital power: the 
husband's occupational prestige and income level, the 
relative educational level of both spouses, the socio­
economic status of the couple, the wife's employment 
outside the home, the wife's age at marriage, the length 
of time between marriage and the birth of the first child, 
the length of time the couple have been married, the 
cultural background of the couple, the traditional-
equalitarian ideological position of the couple, and the 
amount of communication each spouse engages in with the 
other. Husbands are more likely to have greater influence 
on decisions regarding their occupations, and they are 
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likely to be more accurate in their perception of marital 
power, although they tend to exaggerate their power while 
wives tend to underestimate their power. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief 
resume of several attempts to develop a theory of marital 
power and to provide a theoretical explanation of how 
marital power operates in the marital decision-making 
process. 
The Theory of Resources 
According to Broderick (l97l)t the "theory of 
spousal power in decision-making which dominated the 
decade (p. lUl)" of the sixties was Blood and Wolfe's 
theory of resources which was outlined in their book, 
Husbands and Wives (i960). Blood and Wolfe acknowledged 
that, to some extent, the power structure of a marriage is 
influenced by the culturally prescribed authority pattern. 
However, they pointed out that "even in a tradition-bound 
society (p. 13)" there are variations in the marital power 
structures of different couples. Therefore, they concluded 
that such variations suggest that there are sources of 
marital power other than culturally prescribed authority 
patterns. They theorized that the balance of power in a 
marriage is determined primarily by the comparative 
resources which the husband and wife bring to that marriage. 
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The greater one's resources in relation to his spouse, the 
greater his power will be. 
The sources of power in so intimate a relationship 
as marriage must be sought in the comparative 
resources which the husband and wife bring to the 
marriage. ... A resource may be defined as anything 
that one partner may make available to the other, helping 
the latter satisfy his needs or attain his goals. The 
balance of power will be on the side of that partner 
who contributes the greatest resources to the 
marriage (Blood and Wolfe, i 9 6 0 ,  p. 1 2 ) .  
Marriage, according to Blood and Wolfe, is a 
relationship which is designed to meet certain basic needs 
of its participants. To the extent that both spouses 
contribute to each others' need satisfaction they develop a 
relationship of mutual respect which is expressed in mutual 
consultation. As one spouse contributes more than his 
share to the give-and-take of need satisfaction, a 
situation tends to develop in which this spouse has more 
than an equal voice in decision-making. This is not usually 
a conscious or deliberate process. Rather, 
it is an automatic readjustment which occurs as the 
contributing partner discovers that he has a lot to 
offer to the marriage, while the receiving partner 
feels indebted for what has already been given and 
dependent upon what he hopes to receive in the future. 
. . . Hence, power accrues spontaneously to the 
partner who has the greatest resources at his 
disposal (Blood and Wolfe, 1P60, p. 73) • 
A spouse's resources accrue not only from the 
competences which he brings to the marriage but also from 
his participation in the external social system. One's 
participation in the external system especially enhances 
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his resources, and hence his power, in relation to those 
decisions which govern transactions between the family and 
the external system. Therefore, having a child, for example, 
diminishes the wife's resources by diminishing her partici­
pation in the external system while, at the same time, 
making her more dependent on her husband's participation 
in the external system. The growth and ultimate launching 
of her children affords the wife greater freedom to 
participate in the external system, thus gradually restoring 
the power she lost when her small children tended to 
disengage her from the external system (Blood, 1963). 
Also, as the children grow up they become resources upon 
whom the wife can draw in marital decision-making, and 
they may provide companionship and emotional support which 
make the wife less dependent on her husband. Hence, the 
changing resources and power structure of the marriage 
across the family life cycle (Blood and Wolfe, I960). 
In summary, the power to make decisions stems primarily 
from the resources which the individual can provide to 
meet the needs of his marriage partner and to upgrade 
his decision-making skill. Because it is based on 
such tangible and relevant criteria, the balance of 
power may be said to be adapted to the interpersonal 
relationship of the two partners involved (Blood and 
Wolfe, i960, p. hh). 
The Theory of Resources in Cultural Context 
As a result of a cross-cultural study which resulted in 
contradictory findings, Rodman (1967) elaborated Blood and 
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Wolfe's theory of resources into a "theory of resources in 
cultural context (p. 320)." Rodman's data from Greece and 
Yugoslavia indicated that as the husband's education, 
income, occupational prestige, and social position 
increased his traditional family authority decreased. The 
opposite was found to be the case in Prance and in the 
United States. In an attempt to explain these cross-cultural 
contradictions, Rodman found the theory of resources to be 
inadequate. Therefore, he theorized that the marital 
power structure in a given culture is determined "by the 
interaction of (l) the comparative resources of husband 
and wife and (2) the cultural or subcultural expectations 
about the distribution of marital power (p. 322)." 
Rodman interpreted these variables (husband's 
education, income, occupational prestige, and social status) 
as being not only resource variables in the marital power 
structure but also as 
positional values in the social structure. The 
different positions of which they are indicative may 
involve differing patterns of socialization and may, 
for example, represent a greater or lesser likelihood 
of learning sentiments favorable toward the 
equalitarian distribution of power (p. 321). 
In other words, according to Rodman, in Greece and 
Yugoslavia the issue may not be so much the resources in a 
power struggle, but may be the learning of a new role. 
That is, the more education a husband had, the more 
willing he was likely to be to allow his wife more power, 
in spite of a traditional patriarchal culture. Tho faut 
that these same resources (education, income, occupational 
prestige, and social status) tended to increase the 
American husband's marital power was explained by Rodman as 
possibly being due to the influence of several cultural 
factors: a cultural emphasis on equalitarianism, a high 
degree of flexibility concerning the distribution of 
marital power and the importance that education, occupation 
and income have in defining the husband's status. 
Thus, Rodman concluded that simple resource theory 
is valid only in those cultures where the belief system 
will allow marital power to be distributed dynamically and 
that it is inadequate to explain marital power in those 
cultures where spousal power is assigned by strong 
traditional norms (Broderick, 1971)• Marital decision­
making behavior, he believed, is influenced by the inter­
action between resources and cultural definitions and 
norms; hence, the theory of resources in cultural context. 
Rodman compared his theory of marital power to the 
sociological theory of situation, norms and behavior and 
to the psychological theory of S-O-R (stimulus-organism 
with prior experience-response). He saw all three 
theories as similar in their approaches to predicting 
behavior. All three have in common a stimulus or situation, 
an organism with prior experience which may include 
cultural or normative dispositions, and the subsequent 
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behavior which is influenced by the interaction of 
these factors with each other (Rodman, 1967, p. 3^k). 
Exchange Theory 
A third attempt at conceptualizing marital power 
into a theory was made by Heer (1963)> who borrowed and 
adapted exchange theory. Heer's inspiration for theory 
building in this area was also what he perceived as the 
inadequacy of Blood and Wolfe's theory. 
. . . Heer challenged the Blood and Wolfe conceptuali­
zation insisting that it took too little account of 
other factors such as external social control, 
internalized norms, relative involvement, and 
especially the availability of attractive alternatives 
to the marriage. Without entering into the details 
of the debate which ensued it is fair to say that out 
of it emerged a more complex model of pair decision­
making which stretched the usual exchange model to 
include cultural pressures and beliefs as well as 
resources and alternative resources as constructs 
(Broderick, 1971, p. 1U9). 
Briefly stated, what Heer's exchange theory added 
to Blood and Wolfe's resources theory was that the balance 
of power in marriage is influenced by the comparative value 
of the resources obtained within the marriage to the value 
of the resources obtainable in an exchange outside the 
marriage. This theory is an extension of resources theory 
in that the more one is contributing to his marital relation­
ship, the more he is likely to be able to gain from an 
alternative relationship, consequently, the more power he 
is likely to be able to exercise within his marital 
relationship (Rodman, 1967). 
"(Exchange) theory explicitly states that each 
partner to the marriage conceives the possibility of 
separation, divorce and subsequent remarriage (Heer, 1963, 
p. 138)." Heer viewed his theory as being "congruent with 
Wxllard Waller's principle of least interest (p. 138)." 
According to Waller (l 95"l)t the spouse with the least 
interest in the marital relationship is the spouse who is 
most likely to exploit the other. The spouse with the 
least interest is the one for whom the difference between 
actual and potential return for resources contributed is 
the greatest. 
Heer (1963) postulated that the woman who marries 
a successful husband and wants to keep him is less likely 
to contradict him on issues which are important to him 
because she does not want to run the risk of losing him 
since she knows that the alternative choices may not be so 
attractive. On the other hand, the woman who is married 
to an unsuccessful husband might wonder if she made a wise 
choice, and she may be more willing to risk threat to the 
relationship by insisting on her own way. Similarly the 
woman who is working outside the home has the security of 
her ability to support herself should her marriage break 
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up. Consequently, she would likely be more insistent on 
her way than the wife who is not employed outside the home. 
Furthermore, Haer reasoned that the mother of young 
children has less power because her prospects, if she were 
to choose some alternative to her present marriage, may be 
very poor. After the children reach school age her prospects 
improve as she becomes more able to seek gainful employment. 
That the wife's power declines in the post-parental stage 
was explained by Heer as being due to the fact that during 
this stage the sex ratio is such that the probability of 
remarriage for a divorced woman is much lower than for a 
divorced man. Thus the wife becomes more willing to 
concede to the decisions of her husband. This theory also 
seeks to explain the historical rise in wives' power by 
the fact that wives now have greater opportunity for 
gainful employment and for remarriage. Therefore, they 
have the potential for more satisfying alternatives to an 
existing marriage than were available to them a hundred 
years ago. 
In Heer's theory relative involvement is an 
important base of power in marriage. One's power is 
dependent on the relative involvement of each spouse in the 
given area of decision-making. Heer hypothesized (without 
any supporting data), that in most families decisions are 
often traded in a bargaining approach to decision-making. 
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In outlining his application of exchange theory to 
marital power in decision-making, Heer gave five possible 
bases of marital power: external social control, the 
prior internalization of norms, the discrepancy between 
actual return and expected return under an alternative to 
the existing marriage, the relative competence of the two 
spouses and the relative involvement of each spouse in the 
given area of decision-making. 
Parsonian Theory 
The Parsonian Theory of marital power was based on 
Parsons* designation of the husband's role as being 
primarily in the instrumental areas of the marriage and 
the wife's role as being primarily in the expressive areas. 
Parsons held that the husband-wife balance of power is 
divided along these instrumental-expressive lines. That 
is, the husband's position in the family tends to lead to 
superior power for the husband in the instrumental areas 
of activity, and the wife's position tends to lead to 
superior power for the wife in the expressive areas of 
activity (Rollins, 1963). 
If the nuclear family constitutes a social system 
stable over time, it will differentiate roles so that 
instrumental leadership and expressive leadership of 
the system are discriminated—the male adult will 
play the role of the instrumental leader and the 
female adult will play the role of the expressive 
leader (Kotlar, 1962, 17^)• 
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Rollins (1963) found from his research that the 
predictions derived from the Parsonian theory wero 
supported when he used the responses of the female subjects, 
but they were not supported by the responses of the male 
subjects. When the male and female responses were 
combined, there was weak overall support for Parsons' 
theory. Rollins reported that his was the second study in 
the area of family power to find the Parsonian theory 
difficult to confirm and articulate. The earlier study 
was one by Godfrey (1951)• 
The four theories discussed above appear to be the 
most notable attempts to deal specifically with marital 
power. Of the four discussed, when considered in the 
context of the preceding "Review of Literature," Rodman's 
theory of resources in cultural context seems to provide 
the most consistent and adequate explanation of the 
empirical findings and seems to find the most support from 
the research reported. 
The remaining section of this chapter on theory 
deals not with the sources of marital power, but rather it 
represents an effort to conceptualize the process of 
decision-making and how marital power functions in that 
process. This has been done within the framework of 
Balance Theory which has been the focus of much interest 
among social psychologists. 
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Balance Theory 
Balance theory, which grew out of Heider's work in 
the '40's and Newcomb's work in the '50's, is based on the 
proposition that 
in any situation involving two persons and an object 
about which both have important attitudes there is a 
tendency toward symmetry in the triangular system. 
. . . The usefulness of the idea is in predicting the 
directions of adjustment in the case of asymmetrical 
or discrepant combinations (Broderick, 1971» p. 1^3)• 
In conceptualizing and diagramming his theory, 
Heider (ipU6) labeled the three sides of the triad with the 
symbols P, 0 and X. "P" represents some focal person; "0" 
represents some other person; and "X" represents some non-
person object or issue. Heider referred to the relation­
ship between P and 0 as "sentiment relations" and the 
relationship or attitude between P or 0 and X as "unit 
relations." Sentiment relations and unit relations may be 
dichotomized into positive ("like") or negative ("dislike") 
relations. Using this schema Heider came up with eight 
configurations of balance and imbalance (see Figure 1). 
Heider's central proposition was that people prefer 
balance in their interpersonal relations, that one is 
motivated by an intrapersonal force or tension toward the 
attainment of balance. When a state of imbalance exists P 
experiences psychological stress or discomfort. He seeks 
to minimize the stress by maximizing balance, either by 
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Condition Configuration Description 
X X 
Condition I + - /\ - P likes 0; 
(balance) P—-*0 ° P—>0 P and 0 agree 
+ + 
X  X  
Condition II - _/\ - or - - P dislikes 0; 
(balance) P—»0 or P •O P and 0 disagree 
Condition III 
(imbalance) 
X 
/\ 
P—>0 or 
X 
/\ 
P—>0 
P likes 0; 
P and 0 disagree 
Condition IV 
(imbalance) 
X 
/\ 
P—>0 or 
X 
/\ P dislikes 0; 
P and 0 agree 
Figure 1 
Eight Configurations of Balance and Imbalance 
(Taylor, 1967, p. 263) 
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changing his attitude toward X or by changing his 
sentiments toward O (Taylor, 1967)• 
In applying balance theory to this study of 
marital power, P would represent the less powerful spouse 
in the marital dyad, 0 would represent the more powerful 
spouse in the dyad and X could represent either's initial 
expression of a choice or preference in a decision-making 
situation. 
Therefore, the prediction may be made that if there 
is a positive sentiment between husband and wife and if 
they disagree over X, a state of imbalance will occur for 
th© less powerful spouse and he will seek to relieve the 
-a' 
^ • 
tension created by the imbalance by changing his sentiments 
toward the more powerful spouse to a negative or by 
changing his attitude toward X (see Figure 2). 
P, or the focal person, is viewed here as the less 
powerful spouse because the more powerful spouse is less 
likely to change his attitude toward X, and since the less 
powerful spouse is the one who is most often influenced to 
accept the viewpoint and choices of the more powerful 
spouse it may be assumed that the less powerful spouse is 
the one for whom the imbalanced situation creates the 
greatest psychological tension. The extent to which 
tension and the consequent motivation to change his 
attitude toward X is created for the less powerful spouse 
3b 
Alternatives for Restoring 
State of Imbalance Balance 
X„ x1 x1 
-  / \  •  -  / \  •  o r  •  •  
p PO  P * 0  P >0 
+ + 
/ 2 
/ \ " 
/2 / \ - or -
-*0 
/2 / \ 
-* 0 
P = less powerful spouse 
0 = more powerful spouse 
X.j = O's initial preference in a decision-making situation 
Xg = P's initial preference in a decision-making situation 
Figure 2 
Alternatives for Restoring Balance in a 
Decision-Making Situation 
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will be determined by the strength of the sentiment 
relation and of the unit relation. The strength of the 
sentiment relation would be influenced by the relative 
resources of the two spouses (in Blood and Wolfe's terms) 
by the attractiveness of the extra-marital alternatives 
of the less powerful spouse (in Heer's terms) and by the 
cultural norms and expectations (in Rodman's terms). 
This chapter provides a theoretical background 
and framework for this study of marital power. The 
theories discussed in the first part of the chapter, 
especially Rodman's theory of resources in cultural 
context, provide a theoretical explanation of the sources 
of marital power. Balance theory offers a theoretical 
basis and schema for explaining how marital power operates 
in the decision-making process. Therefore, taken together, 
the theory of resources in cultural context and balance 
theory provide the researcher with a relatively complete 
conceptual framework for studying marital power in decision 
making. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHOD AND PROCEDURES 
For this study an experimental research design, 
using a control group and an experimental group, was 
employed in an effort to test the effect of husband-wife 
communication on marital power in decision-making. 
Subjects 
The subjects for the study were 40 couples who 
were selected from the parents of the two-, three-, and 
four-year-old children enrolled in the School of Home 
Economics Nursery School program at the University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro. Subjects were chosen on the 
basis of family data which were reported by the subjects, 
(see Appendix A). A total of 76 couples returned the 
information requested on this form. This information was 
used to select as homogeneous a sample as possible on the 
following variables: number of times both spouses had 
been married, length of marriage, wife's age at marriage, 
age difference between husband and wife, length of time 
between marriage and the birth of the first child, 
difference in educational level of husband and wife, wife's 
outside-the-home employment status, husband's present 
income level, and the religious background of the couple. 
The total sample had the following characteristics: 
no spouse had been previously married; all marriages were 
intact at the time of the study; mean length of marriage, 
8.25 years; mean age of wives at marriage, 22.43 years; 
mean age difference between husbands and wives, 2.85 years 
(husbands older); mean length of time between marriage and 
birth of the first child, 2.79 years; husband's mean 
educational level, 4.88 years above high school; wife's 
mean educational level, 3«^9 years above high school; 
mean difference in educational level of husbands and wives, 
1.19 years in favor of the husbands; mean level of 
husbands' present annual income, #14,450 (using the lower 
level of the ranges, see Appendix A); none of the wives 
were employed outside the home; both spouses had Protestant 
religious backgrounds for 32 of the couples, and there were 
8 couples where both husband and wife were Jewish. 
After the 40 couples had been selected, they were 
randomly assigned to an experimental group and a control 
group, with 20 couples in each group. The variable of the 
differences in the religious backgrounds of the Protestants 
and the Jews was controlled by randomly assigning 16 
Protestant couples and U Jewish couples to each group. After 
the couples had been randomly assigned to the two groups 
the groups were compared. A _t test was used to analyze the 
means of the two groups on each of the variables listed 
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above. There was no significant difference in the two 
groups on any of the variables (see Table 7). 
Instruments 
The Decision Power Index (see Appendix B) was desi 
to measure the relative decision-making power of husband 
and wife so that it can be expressed as a score. The 
subject was asked to indicate "who has the final say" 
with respect to twelve family decisions. Eight of these 
decisions were used specifically by Blood and Wolfe (lp60) 
in their Decision Power Index and were regarded as samples 
of the types of relatively important decisions which a 
typical family makes—what job the husband should take, 
what car to get, whether or not to buy life insurance, 
where to go on vacations, what house or apartment to take, 
whether or not the wife should go to work or quit work, 
what doctor to have, and how much money to spend on food. 
Four additional items, adapted from the larger 
questionnaire (Blood and Wolfe, 1960), were added—where 
to go on a holiday outing, when sexual relations will 
occur, what T. V. program to watch in the evening, and 
whether and/or when the children will have music or 
dancing lessons. 
Possible responses were weighted by Blood and 
Wolfe (i960), ranging from five (husband always) to one 
(wife always), and summed to obtain the Decision Power 
TABLE 1 
A Comparison of the Control and Experimental 
Groups on Six Variables 
Years 
Husband 
Older 
Length of Than 
Marriage Wife 
Time from 
Wife's Age Marriage to 
at Birth of 
Marriage First Child 
Difference in 
Educational 
Level of 
Husband and 
Wife (in 
Favor of 
Husband) 
Husband's 
Annual 
Jncome 
Experimental 
Group Mean 7.98 Yrs. 2.97 22.27 Yrs. 2.62 Yrs. 1.15 Yrs. $14,500 
Control Group 
Mean 8.53 Yrs. 2.72 22.59 Yrs. 2.96 Yrs. 1.23 Yrs. $lU,U00 
. 5971  .3131 .3^38 . 6271  .0986 .2182 
j: value at 
.05 2.0252 2.0252 2.0252 2.0252 2.0252 2.0252 
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Index. For the present study the scoring system was 
changed so that the responses were scored as follows: 
husband always, plus two; husband more than wife, plus 
one; husband and wife exactly the same, zero; wife more 
than husband, minus one; wife always, minus two. The 
scores were summed and interpreted so that a plus score 
indicated husband more powerful, a minus score indicated 
wife more powerful, and a score of zero represented a 
balance of power between the two spouses. 
"The instrument has been used in a number of 
studies and has been found to differentiate between groups 
or to be correlated with other variables in a theoretically 
meaningful pattern (Straus, 1969, p. Ul)." 
The Risk-Taking Decision (see Appendix C) used in 
this study was devised by Wallach and Kogan (1959) and was 
first used by them to investigate individual differences 
in risk-taking. It was later used by J. A. Stoner in 
research for a dissertation submitted to the School of 
Industrial Management at M. I. T. (Brown, 19&5)• Stoner 
used the Risk-Taking Decision in small group research in 
which he had the subjects to respond to the decision as if 
they were advising someone else to make the decision. 
They responded privately first. Then they participated in 
group discussion and arrived at a group decision. Finally, 
they were asked to respond privately again. 
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Stoner's subjects were graduate students of 
industrial management. They first studied the 
problems, twelve problems in all (the one being used 
in the present study plus eleven others), and made 
individual decisions on each problem. Subsequently 
they were assembled in groups of six and instructed 
to discuss each problem and to arrive at a unanimous 
group decision. Twenty-three other subjects did not 
meet as groups but did study the problems a second 
time, after a lapse of a few weeks. Stoner put 
together thirteen groups and for twelve of these the 
predominant direction of shift on the problems between 
the means of the initial individual decisions and the 
later group decisions was toward greater risk. The 
twenty-three control subjects showed no systematic 
shift in either direction. 
Stoner also asked his subjects to record their 
private judgments after the group decision had been 
made. . . . These private opinions, subsequent to 
discussion, were compared with the private opinions 
expressed in advance of discussion. About 45 per cent 
of the subjects did not change their private views; of 
the remainder, however, 39 per cent changed toward 
greater risk and only 16 per cent toward greater 
caution. Something in the group discussion appears to 
have influenced private opinions ... in the direction 
of greater riskiness (Brown, 19^5* p. 659)• 
In adapting the Risk-Taking Decision for use in 
this research, two changes were made: the decision was 
reworded so that rather than being put in the position of 
advisers the husbands and wives were asked to put themselves 
in the position of having to make the decision about the 
husband's occupation; also the number of possible responses 
was increased from 6 to 10. As devised by Wallach and 
Kogan the decision had the following possible responses: 
the chances are 1 in 10, 3 in 10, 5 in 10, 7 in 10, 9 in 10 
that the company will prove financially sound and Mr. A 
should not take the new job, no matter what the 
probabilities. The four additional responses, added for 
this research, were: 2 in 10, U in 10, 6 in 10, and 8 in 
10 that the company will prove financially sound. The 
responses were assigned scores, ranging from a score of 
1 for the response, "He should not take the new job no 
matter what the probabilities," to a score of 10 for the 
response, "The chances are 1 in 10 that the company will 
prove financially sound." 
Procedure 
The study was conducted in the homes of the subjects 
Appointments were made with the couples and all the data 
were collected by the researcher; Each husband and wife 
was asked to make separate written responses to the 
Decision Power Index (see Appendix B). Then the couples 
were asked to respond to the pretest. This required each 
husband and each wife to make a separate written response 
to the risk-taking decision (see Appendix c) adapted from 
Wallach and Kogan (1959). 
Each husband and each wife in the experimental 
group was given his own and his spouse's response to the 
pretest (see Appendix D). Then they were asked to discuss 
their decision for fifteen minutes. Their discussion was 
recorded on tape and later analyzed for the number of times 
and the total amount of time each spouse talked. One 
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couple would not agree for their discussion to be taped. 
At the end of the discussion period the couple was asked 
to again respond independently to the same risk-taking 
decision as was used in the pretest. This second response 
comprised the posttest. 
Following the pretest each husband and each wife 
in the control group was asked to sit facing in opposite 
directions so that they could not see each other. The 
reason for asking them to face in opposite directions so 
that they could have no visual contact with each other 
was to prevent any non-verbal communication between the 
couple. Prom their study of the effects of visibility on 
interaction in a dyad, Argyle, Lalljee, and Cook ( ip68)  
reported that visibility serves the following functions in 
communication: 
(1) it provides feedback information concerning the 
other's direction of attention, whether or not he is 
still listening, about his emotional state and about 
his attitude to the speaker; 
(2) it assists in "synchronizing" or "meshing" the 
behavior of the two participants; 
(3) if one looks at the other a lot this indicates some 
intensity of involvement or concern of the former with 
the latter, which may be affiliative/sexual or 
dominative/competitive (pp. 5-6). 
The couples in the control group were also asked 
not to communicate with each other verbally. Each spouse 
was informed of his own and his spouse's response to the 
pretest (see Appendix D). A musical tape recording, 
completely unrelated to the experiment, was played for 
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fifteen minutes. The tape was a collection of classical 
music played by a string orchestra. At the end of the 
fifteen-minute period the couple was again asked to respond 
independently to the same risk-taking decision as was used 
for the pretest. This second response comprised the 
posttest. 
The instruments were color coded to distinguish 
the husband and wife forms and they were marked to 
distinguish the pretest from the posttest. 
Hypotheses 
1. The husbands and wives in the experimental 
group will make significantly greater progress toward 
consensus in the decision-making task than the husbands 
and wives in the control group. 
2. On the posttest the mean of the difference 
between the responses of the husbands and wives in the 
control group will be significantly larger than the mean 
of the difference between the responses of the husbands 
and wives in the experimental group. 
3. The mean of the scores of the husbands on the 
pretest will show significantly greater risk-taking than 
the mean of the scores of the wives on the pretest. 
k. For the experimental group, the posttest 
responses will be more in the direction of the pretest 
^5 
response of the spouse who is perceived by the husband as 
more powerful in the self-report of power. 
5. Since the risk-taking decision in this study 
involves the husband's occupation the husbands in the 
experimental group will exercise greater influence than 
the wives on the decision. 
6. The spouse in the experimental group who talks 
more frequently during the discussion will exercise 
greater power on the posttest response than the spouse in 
the experimental group who talks less frequently. 
7. The spouse in the experimental group who talks 
more (total time) during the discussion will exercise 
greater power on the posttest response than the spouse in 
the experimental group who talks less. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
When the posttest scores were compared with the 
pretest scores the results showed that 1U couples in the 
experimental group and 10 couples in the control group had 
made progress toward consensus. For three of the couples 
in the experimental group and four of the couples in the 
control group the husband and wife had identical pretest 
and posttest scores so that there was no pretest difference 
between the husband's and wife's score and there was no 
change from pretest to posttest. Of the husbands and 
wives who had different scores on the pretest three couples 
in the experimental group and six couples in the control 
group made no gain toward consensus from pretest to posttest. 
There was not a case in either group where the husband and 
wife were farther apart on the posttest than on the pretest. 
by subtracting the differences in the posttest scores of 
each husband and wife from the difference in the pretest 
scores of each husband and wife. 
The gain scores for the two groups were computed 
Example: Pretest Posttest 
H = 7 
V = ? 
d = 2 
H = 8 
W = 3 
d = 5 
Gain score = 5-2=3 
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The experimental group had a mean gain score of 2 
as compared with 1.1 for the control group. A comparison 
of the two group means yielded a £ score of 1.55 which was 
not significant at the .05 level. (The £ value at the .05 
level with 38 df = 2.027). Therefore, the first hypothesis 
was rejected. While the data indicated a definite trend 
toward greater consensus among the couples in the 
experimental group than among the couples in the control 
group, the difference was not statistically significant. 
A jfc test for related measures was then used to 
analyze separately the gain scores of the experimental group 
and the gain scores of the control group. The results 
were a £ score of k.j6 for the experimental group which 
was significant at the .05 level, and a £ score of .98 for 
the control group which was not significant at the .05 
level. Summarizing: Although the experimental group did 
make significant progress toward consensus and the control 
group did not, the experimental group did not make 
significantly greater progress toward consensus than did 
the control group. Thus, there was some evidence to favor 
the hypothesis; but, lacking complete verification, it 
should be rejected until further research evidence is 
obtained. 
The second hypothesis predicted that on the posttest 
the mean of the difference between the responses of the 
husbands and wives in the control group would be 
significantly larger than the mean of the difference 
between the responses of the husbands and wives in the 
experimental group. The respective mean difference scores 
for the two groups were 1.3 and .951 which, when compared, 
resulted in a t^ score of .95• Since this was not 
significant, the hypothesis was rejected. Jt should be 
noted that there was one "deviant" score of 8 in the 
experimental group. The next highest score in the 
experimental group was 2 and the highest score in the 
control was 4. With an N of 20 this one deviant score may 
have had a significant effect on the mean score of the 
experimental group. 
As predicted in hypothesis three, the scores of 
the husbands and the wives on the pretest indicated that 
the husbands in this study were willing to take a 
significantly greater risk on the decision involved than 
were their wives. The husbands had a mean pretest score 
of 6.1 (a score of 6 indicated that one was willing to 
accept the new position if the chances were 5 in 10 that 
the new company would succeed). The wives had a mean 
pretest score of 4.85 (a score of 4 meant that one was 
willing to accept the new position if the chances were 7 in 
10 that the new company would succeed). When analyzed the 
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data resulted in a t_ score of 2.81 which is significant at 
the .01 level. 
experimental group the posttest responses of the couples 
would be more in the direction of the pretest response of 
the spouse who was perceived by the husband as more 
powerful in the self-report of power (Decision Power Index, 
Appendix B). 
analyze the mean difference in change toward or away from 
the spouse who was perceived by the husband as more 
powerful and the spouse who was perceived by the husband as 
less powerful. The differences in change scores were 
computed by subtracting the change score of the spouse 
perceived as more powerful from the change score of the 
spouse perceived as less powerful. 
The fourth hypothesis stated that for the 
The t test for related measures was used to 
Example Pretest Posttest 
10 
9  
8 PMP +1 PMP = spouse 
7 
6 
•PMP 
PLP 
perceived 
as more 
powerful 
PLP = spouse 
2 
1 
perceived 
as less 
powerful 
PLP - PMP = change score 
3 - 1 = +2 
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A plus score meant that the spouse perceived as 
more powerful was actually more powerful and a minus score 
meant that the spouse perceived as less powerful was 
actually more powerful in this study. When analyzed, the 
data resulted in a mean difference in change score of 1.61 
and a t_ value of 2.7578> which is significant at the .02 
level. Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted. The 
spouse who was perceived by the husband as more powerful 
did exercise greater power on the decision used in this 
study. 
Husbands were more often perceived as more 
powerful by both spouses (see Tables 2 and 3)• However, 
while both spouses more often perceived the husband as 
more powerful, the husbands' assessment of the power 
structure was more accurate. A t. test for related 
measures was used to analyze the mean difference in change 
toward or away from the spouse who was perceived by the 
wife as more powerful and the spouse who was perceived by 
the wife as less powerful as measured by the Decision 
Power Jndex (see Appendix B). The result was a £ score 
of 2.1017 which is not quite significant at the .05 level. 
(The £ value at the .05 level = 2.145.) Since the test 
based on the husbands' perceptions was significant, the 
husbands' assessment of the power structure of the 
marriages involved in this study was more accurate than the 
wives' assessment. 
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TABLE 2 
Spouse Perceived as More Powerful by Husband 
Control Experimental 
H I k  13 . 27 X2 = 11 .76  
W 2 5 7 P . 001  
16  18 34 
1 df 
TABLE 3 
Spouse Perceived as More Powerful by Wife 
Control Experimental 
H 1U 11 25 
n 
CM *
 10.12 
w 4 3 7 P .005 
18 14 32 
1 df 
When the perceived power scores of the husbands 
were compared with the perceived power scores of the wives, 
a £ test for related measures (using couples' absolute 
difference scores) yielded a j: score of 7.57 which is 
significant beyond the .001 level. 
Hypothesis number four was intended for the 
experimental group. However, the J; test for related 
measures was also used to analyze the mean difference in 
change toward or away from the spouse perceived as more 
powerful and the spouse perceived as less powerful by the 
husbands in the control group. The result was a jt score 
of 2.U039t which is significant at the .05 level. The 
spouse who was perceived as more powerful by the husbands 
in the control group also exercised greater power on the 
decision used in this study. In comparing the experimental 
and control groups there was no significant difference in 
the tendency of the spouse perceived by the husband as less 
powerful to shift toward the spouse perceived by the husband 
as more powerful in the two groups. The t_ test for a 
difference between two independent means was used to 
compare the experimental mean (1.61) and the control mean 
(1.063)' The result was a t_ score of .7323 which is not 
significant at the .05 level. Since both groups yielded 
significant evidence for the hypothesis, and since they did 
not differ between themselves the hypothesis must be accepted 
for both the esqperimental and control groups. 
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In order to test hypothesis number five a _t test 
was used to analyze the mean of the actual power scores 
for the experimental group to see if the scores were sig­
nificantly greater than zero in the plus direction. This 
was appropriate since a power score in the plus direction 
from zero signified that the husband was more powerful 
and a power score in the minus direction signified that 
the wife was more powerful. 
Examples: 
Pretest Posttest 
10 
9 
8 H W - H = Power score 
7 \ 1 - 4 = -3 (wife more 
6 \ +4 powerful) 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Pretest Posttest 
10 
9 0 
8 H' H 
g k  -  0  =  +k  (Husband 
K / powerful) 
1 /** 
3 w 
2 
1 
Thirteen of the scores were in the plus direction 
with only one in the minus direction. There were six zero 
scores which indicated that neither spouse had greater actual 
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power. The mean power score for the group was 1.8 which 
resulted in a t_ value of 3*7578 which is significant at 
the .01 level. Therefore, in the experimental group the 
husbands exercised greater power than the wives on the 
decision used in this study. 
The fifth hypothesis dealt only with the 
ejqjerimental group. However, since there was also a shift 
toward consensus in the control group the same analysis 
was used to compare the mean of the actual power scores 
of the control group with zero to determine whether the 
scores were significantly greater than zero in the plus 
direction. For the control group there were nine scores 
in the plus direction with none in the minus direction and 
11 zero scores. The mean power score for the control 
group was 1.0 which resulted in a significant t. value of 
2.81J7• (The t_ value at the .05 level = 2.093*) When the 
experimental and control groups were compared, no sig­
nificant difference was found between the mean power score 
of the experimental group (1.8) and the mean power score 
of the control group (1.0). (_t = 1.3^1, not significant at 
the .05 level.) Thus, even in the control group where 
there was no husband-wife communication but where each 
spouse was given the other's pretest response by the 
experimenter the husbands had significant influence on the 
wives' decision. 
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Por both hypotheses four and five the scores were 
derived so that a positive score would indicate a shift 
towards one spouse (the spouse perceived as more powerful 
in four and the husband in five), and a negative score 
would indicate a shift toward the other spouse (the spouse 
perceived as less powerful in four and the wife in five). 
The most logical way to test the hypotheses was then to 
compute t, tests asking if the means of the distributions 
were different from zero. It might be argued that a 
preferable test would be a £ test of differences (thus 
differences between mean changes in the more and less 
powerful spouse in four, for example). In this study the 
two tests are mathematically the same. Goth test the mean 
of the differences over a denominator based on the 
standard error of the mean of the differences and the 
number of pairs. 
The sixth and seventh hypotheses predicted that 
the spouse in the experimental group who talked more 
frequently and the spouse who talked more (total time) 
during the discussion would exercise greater power on the 
posttest response than the spouse in the experimental group 
who talked less frequently and the spouse who talked less 
(total time). 
Por hypothesis six a t_ test was used to analyze 
the mean of the actual power scores for the experimental 
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group to see if the scores were significantly greater than 
zero in the plus direction. The scores were computed so 
that a positive score signified that the spouse who talked 
more frequently during the discussion was actually more 
powerful, whereas a negative score indicated that the 
spouse who talked less frequently was more powerful. 
Examples: 
Pretest Posttest 
10 
9  
8 MPT +1 
7 MPT 
6 LPT 
5  / ,  
3 LPT 
2 
1 
MPT = Spouse who talked more 
frequently 
LPT = Spouse who talked less 
frequently 
LPT - MPT = More powerful spouse 
3-1 = +2 (Spouse who talked 
more frequently more 
powerful) 
Pretest Posttest 
10 
9 
8 MPT 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3  
2 
1 
\ +U 
LPT 
MPT 
LFT 
0 - 4 = -4 (Spouse who talked 
less frequently more 
powerful) 
There were nine plus scores, four minus scores, and 
four zero scores (a zero score indicated neither spouse was 
more powerful than the other). There were two cases where 
the husband and wife talked the same number of times, and 
there was one couple who would not allow their discussion 
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to be taped. The mean power score for the group was .7^5 
in the plus direction but the score was not statistically 
significant (jt = 1.0624). Therefore, hypothesis six was 
rejected. 
For hypothesis seven a £ test was used to analyze 
the actual power scores of the experimental group to see 
if the scores were significantly greater than zero in the 
plus direction. As in the previous hypothesis, the scores 
were computed by subtracting the pretest-to-posttest change 
of the spouse who talked more (total time) from the 
pretest-to-posttest change of the spouse who talked less 
(total time). A score in the plus direction from zero 
indicated the spouse who talked more (total time) during 
the discussion was more powerful and a score in the minus 
direction signified that the spouse who talked less (total 
time) during the discussion was more powerful. There were 
eight plus scores, five minus scores and five zero scores 
(indicating neither spouse was more powerful than the 
other). For one of the couples the husband and wife talked 
the same length of time and one cot^le would not allow 
their discussion to be taped. The mean power score for 
the group was 1.278 in the plus direction from zero. This 
resulted in a t score of 2.0273 which is significant at 
the .10 level but not at the .05 level. (The t_ value at 
the .05 level = 2.110) Therefore, while there was a 
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strong tendency for the spouse who talked more (total time) 
to have greater power on the decision used in this study, 
the result was not statistically acceptable at the 
probability level used and with the N available in this 
study. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
Regarding the first hypothesis, that the 
experimental group would make greater progress toward 
consensus than the control group, the data indicated that 
the couples in the experimental group made progress toward 
consensus in the decision-making task. This progress, 
when measured between the pretest and posttest, was 
statistically significant at the .05 level of significance. 
However, the progress of the experimental group was not so 
much greater than that of the control group that it was 
statistically significant when the two groups were 
compared. Thus, the failure of the data to support the 
hypothesis was not due to the experimental group's not 
changing significantly in the hypothesized direction, but 
rather it was due to the fact that the control group also 
changed, though not significantly so, in the same direction, 
which was not anticipated. 
That the control group made progress toward consensus 
in the decision-making task without any discussion of the 
decision can probably best be explained within the frame­
work of balance theory, which was discussed in Chapter III. 
When the less powerful spouse (P) was informed by the 
experimenter of the pretest response (x) of the more 
powerful spouse ( o ) ,  the less powerful spouse, according 
to balance theory, was thrown into a state of imbalance. 
This imbalance probably created psychological tension 
which motivated the less powerful spouse to seek to regain 
a balanced state. Therefore, during the fifteen minute 
period between the pretest and the posttest the less 
powerful spouse decided to recover a balanced state by 
changing his response to more closely approximate the 
response of the more powerful spouse (see Figure 3)• In 
fact, several wives in the control group told the 
experimenter at the end of the experiment that as they 
listened to the tape they thought about the husband's 
response and decided that he knew best and, therefore, 
changed their response to agree with his. One wife said, 
"As I listened to the music, I could just hear all my 
husband's arguments, so I decided to accept his position." 
What then of those couples who did not move closer 
together from pretest to posttest? Their lack of change 
toward consensus may be explained in one of several 
possible ways: P may not have taken the hypothetical 
decision-making task seriously enough for the imbalance to 
create enough psychological tension to motivate him to 
change. Furthermore, while P's general sentiment toward 
0 may have been positive, the immediate feelings of P 
toward 0 may have been negative and, therefore, P's 
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Pretest (imbalance) 15-Minute Period Posttest (balance) 
X 
- / V  
P reduces 
tension by-
changing 
attitude tov/ard 
X to agree with 
0 
X 
/\ 
? » 0 
Figure 3 
Diagram of the Less Powerful Spouse's 
Balance-Restoring Behavior from 
Pretest to Posttest 
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disagreement with 0 created a condition of balance. Since 
the experimenter had no way of knowing what transpired 
between the couples prior to his arrival and since there 
was no way to evaluate the emotional climate at the 
moment of the experiment, all one can do is speculate at 
this point. Another possible explanation may be that P 
may have perceived that to change his response to that of 
his spouse would tend to make him "look bad" or "weak" to 
the experimenter who was going to see his pretest and 
posttest responses. Therefore, he was put in a double 
bind in which to "save face" with the experimenter was 
more tension-reducing than to agree with his spouse. 
Whatever the explanation for couples in the 
control group changing toward greater consensus, the fact 
that they did change seems to indicate that husbands and 
wives know how the other thinks and marital power tends to 
operate even when there is no communication about the 
specific decision involved. 
The experimental group may have made significantly 
greater progress toward consensus than the control group 
had the couples in the experimental group been instructed 
to reach a definite agreement in their discussion. However, 
they were simply instructed to discuss the decision as if 
they were confronted with the situation described in the 
risk-taking decision (Appendix c) and were having to make 
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that decision. Therefore, they were not required to reach 
a consensus in their discussion which probably affected 
their posttest responses. 
The non-significant finding in hypothesis two is 
congruent with the findings in hypothesis one. Since the 
experimental group did not make significantly greater 
progress toward consensus than the control group, the mean 
of the difference between the responses of the husbands 
and wives in the control group was not significantly 
greater than the mean of the difference between the 
responses of the husbands and wives in the experimental 
group. 
The fact that the husbands were willing to take a 
greater risk in responding to the pretest than their 
wives, as predicted in hypothesis three, is in agreement 
with the general conception that wives in our culture tend 
to be more security-oriented than husbands. In a study 
of sex differences in judgment, Wallach and Kogan (1959) 
used the risk-taking decision from which the decision for 
this study was adapted as one of their decision-making 
situations. The major difference was that their subjects 
were put in the role of advisers to someone facing the 
decision rather than being put in the position of having 
to make the decision for themselves. Wallach and Kogan 
found that there was no significant difference in the 
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responses of males and females. However, in responding to 
a similar decision involving the risk of income loss 
through an investment, they found the females to be 
significantly more conservative than the males. Possible 
loss of income was a factor in the decision used in this 
study. 
A question that was frequently raised by the 
wives during the discussion of the decision with their 
husbands was, "Could you come back to your present job if 
the new company failed?" On the other hands, the husbands 
more frequently saw the offer from the new company as a 
chance for adventure, an opportunity to prove themselves 
and as an escape from a more stilted and static, though 
more secure, position. Thus, the husbands' responses 
reflected greater risk-taking than the responses of their 
wive s. 
For hypothesis four the husband's perceived power 
score was used to measure the relationship between 
perceived power and 'actual power because other research 
has resulted in significant discrepancies between husbands' 
and wives' perceptions of marital power (Burchinal and 
Bauder, 1965; Heer, 1962; Safilios-Rothschild, 1969; 
Scanzoni, 1965; Wilkening and Morrison, 1963; Olson, 1968). 
Research has also indicated that the husband's assessment 
of the power structure is likely to be more accurate than 
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that of the wife (Heer, 1963). The findings of the 
.present study were consistent with previous research on 
both points. There were significant differences in the 
husbands' and wives1 perceptions of marital power. While 
there was overall agreement by husbands and wives that the 
husband was more often perceived as more powerful, when 
their perceived power scores were compared there was almost 
no agreement. Only two husbands and wives had identical 
perceived power scores, while 21 of the wives perceived 
their husbands as more powerful than their husbands 
perceived themselves and 17 the wives perceived their 
husbands as less powerful than their husbands perceived 
themselves. 
The discrepancy between husbands' and wives' 
perceptions of the marital power structure may be 
explained by the fact that couples are not accustomed to 
conceptualizing their interaction in terms of who actually 
makes certain decisions. The Decision Power Index 
(Appendix B) required couples to recall past decision­
making experiences. Research has indicated that 
individuals were unable to recall what occurred in their 
interaction with their spouses even soon after the inter­
action took place (Kenkel, 19&3i Olson and Rabunsky, 1972). 
"Even if one makes a conscious effort to concentrate on an 
interaction with another, the give-and-take that takes 
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place in decision-making usually disguises who actually 
made the final decision (Olson and Rabunsky, 1972, p. 
2 2 9 ) . "  
Families characteristically have more difficulty in 
reporting who makes family decisions because mutual 
consultation so often precedes the final decision 
that the relative influence of each partner tends to 
be masked in the process (Blood, 1958, p. 47). 
The problem of recall and the relative obscurity 
of actual marital power in decision-making plus the 
subjectivity of how individuals perceive themselves and 
their influence leave little room for surprise at the lack 
of agreement between husbands' and wives' perceptions of 
marital power. 
That husbands were more accurate than wives in 
their assessment of the marital power structure is not so 
easily explained. In fact, no satisfactory explanation 
has been given by previous researchers and none can be 
offered here. The observation can only be made that in 
this study the husbands' perceptions of marital power were 
significantly accurate when measured by the actual power 
scores whereas the wives' perceptions were not significantly 
accurate. 
The fifth hypothesis, that the husbands would 
exercise greater power than the wives on the decision, was 
supported by the data. Two factors, apart from the fact 
that the husbands were more often perceived as more 
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powerful by both spouses, probably affected the outcome of 
the results on this hypothesis. First, the decision used 
in this study involved the husband's occupation. There­
fore, one would expect the husband to have greater influence 
on the decision. The second factor which may have 
influenced these results was the sex of the experimenter. 
Kenkel (1961B) conducted a study of marital decision­
making in which half the couples were interviewed and 
observed by a male and half by a female. He reported that 
92$ of the wives in the female-observed group had high or 
medium influence whereas 72$ of the wives in the male-
observed group had high or medium influence. High 
influence by the wives was only half as likely to occur in 
the male-observed group. Since the sex of the researcher 
in this study was a male, this may have had some influence 
on the results being in the direction of the husband. 
However, that the husbands were perceived as more powerful 
and that the decision dealt with the husband's occupation 
were probably much more salient factors than the sex of 
the researcher. 
Contrary to the predicted outcome in hypothesis 
six, the spouse who talked more frequently during the 
discussion did not exercise significantly greater power on 
the posttest response than the spouse who talked less 
frequently. There was a trend in the predicted direction 
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but it was not significant at the .05 level. Previous 
studies have found a significant relationship between 
frequency and/or amount of communication and influence in 
decision-making (Strodtbeck, 1951 > Smock, 1971)• One 
possible explanation for no significant support for this 
hypothesis from the data of this study is that each verbal 
communication was scored as a communication frequency even 
when that communication was no more than an "uh-huh" of 
agreement, a "yes" or a "no." Therefore, there were some 
cases where one spouse did most of the talking but the 
other spouse "talked" more frequently. 
Regarding hypothesis seven, there was a strong 
tendency for the spouse who talked more during the 
discussion to exercise greater power on the posttest 
response than the spouse who talked less. However, the 
tendency was not quite strong enough to be significant at 
the .05 level. The trend was in the predicted direction 
and was congruent with previous research (Strodtbeck, 1951» 
Smock, 1971). The result may prove significant with the 
use of a larger N. 
More research is needed on the effect of husband-
wife communication on marital power in decision-making. A 
study similar to this one could be considerably 
strengthened by increasing the number of subjects. Another 
recommendation would be to instruct the couples to arrive 
at a unanimous joint decision during the discussion and 
then possibly have them respond to a posttest separately. 
Another type of exercise for the control group, which 
would distract them from thinking about the decision, may 
yield different results. The risk-taking decision 
(Appendix C) is recommended for further use as a decision­
making task for couples. As a whole the couples in this 
study related to the decision quite well, with at least 
of the couples indicating that at some point in their 
experience they had been confronted with a very similar 
type of decision. Others said they had talked about such 
a situation. Those couples who had the greatest 
difficulty relating to the decision were couples where the 
husbands were physicians. Their training and ejqperience 
were such that they could not project themselves very well 
into the "present position" described in Appendix C. Nor 
could they very easily see themselves as moving into an 
entirely new business venture. 
A study could be designed so that the couples were 
administered the pretest and then instructed to discuss the 
decision over a period of several weeks since such decisions 
are not usually made in 15 minutes. One husband suggested 
that the tape recorder be left for a week and that they be 
allowed to discuss the decision at various intervals during 
that week. 
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If the Decision Power Index (Appendix B) were to 
be used with a comparable sample the questions concerning 
the purchase of a car and which television program to watch 
should be changed. All the couples in the sample used in 
this study had two cars and most had two television sets. 
Therefore, the experimenter had to ask each couple to 
assume they were buying a family car which both would use 
and to assume they had only one television set. 
In view of the recent criticisms of marital power 
studies based on self-reports of power (Safilios-
flothschild, 1969, 1970; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk 
and Bell, 1972; and others), more studies which measure 
actual power in decision-making are needed. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the 
effect of husband-wife communication on marital power in 
decision-making. The subjects were UO couples who were 
selected from the parents of children enrolled in the 
School of Home Economics Nursery School program at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro. The subjects 
were selected on the basis of their homogeneity of 
characteristics related to variables that had been found 
to affect marital power in previous research. Couples 
were randomly assigned to a control and an experimental 
group, with 20 couples in each group. The data were 
collected in the homes of the couples in the spring of 
1972. A Decision Power Jndex was administered to each 
spouse to ascertain his perception of marital power. The 
pretest consisted of each spouse responding to a risk-
taking decision. This was followed by 15 minutes of 
discussion of the decision by the couples in the 
experimental group and a 15-niinute period of no communica­
tion by the control group, during which time a musical 
tape was played. At the end of the 15-minute period each 
spouse in both groups made a second response to the risk-
taking decision which comprised the posttest. 
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Seven hypotheses were tested at the .05 level of 
significance. Pour of the hypotheses were found not to be 
significant: 
1. The husbands and wives in the experimental group 
will make significantly greater progress toward consensus 
in the decision-making task than the husbands and wives in 
the control group. 
2. On the posttest the mean of the difference 
between the responses of the husbands and wives in the 
control group will be significantly larger than the mean 
of the difference between the responses of the husbands 
and wives in the experimental group. 
3. The spouse in the experimental group who talks 
more frequently during the discussion will exercise greater 
power on the posttest response than the spouse in the 
experimental group who talks less frequently. 
4 .  The spouse in the ejqperimental group who talks 
more (total time) during the discussion will exercise 
greater power on the posttest response than the spouse in 
the experimental group who talks less. 
Three of the hypotheses were supported by the data: 
1. The mean of the scores of the husbands on the 
pretest will show significantly greater risk-taking than 
the mean of the scores of the wives on the pretest. 
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2. For the experimental group, the posttest 
responses will be more in the direction of the pretest 
response of the spouse who is perceived by the husband as 
more powerful in the self-report of power. 
3. The husbands in the eatperimental group will 
exercise greater influence than the wives on the 
decision. 
The major conclusions of the study were as follows: 
1. While husband-wife communication has a 
tendency to affect marital power in decision-making, the 
dynamics of marital power are such that they affect 
decision-making, especially by the less powerful spouse, 
even when there is no interspousal communication about a 
specific decision. 
2. Husbands are more willing to take risks in 
decisions regarding their occupations and income than their 
wives who are more conservative with regard to such 
decisions. 
3. Husbands' assessments of the marital power 
structure are more accurate than wives' assessments. 
4. Both husbands and wives more often perceive 
husbands as more powerful. 
5. Husbands are more powerful in decisions related 
to their occupations. 
6. The spouse who talks more during husband-wife 
communication has a tendency to have greater influence in 
de ci sion-making. 
7. Further research is needed to investigate the 
effect of communication on marital power in decision­
making. 
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FAMILY DATA SHEET 
Name 
Address Telephone No. 
Present marital status: married separated 
divorced widowed 
Is this the first marriage for husband and wife? yes no 
Date of present marriage: 
month date year 
Husband's birth date: 
month date year 
Wife's birth date: 
month date year 
Birth dates of children (month, date, year): 
Circle the highest level of education achieved: 
high school college graduate school 
Husband: 1 2  3  b  1 2 3 b  1  2  3  b  5  6  7  8  
wife: 1 2 3 b  1 2 3 b  1  2  3  b  5  6  7  8  
Husband's present occupation ______________________________ 
Husband's annual income (do not include wife's income): 
less than $5,000  $11 ,000  -  $12 ,999  
15,000 - $6 ,999  $13 ,000  -  $1b ,999  
$7.000 -  $8,999  $15 ,000  and above 
#9,000 - $10 ,999  
82 
Is wife currently employed outside the home? ______ 
part-time 
full-time 
Religious background: 
Husband: Protestant Catholic Jewish 
Greek Orthodox Other: _____________ 
Wife: Protestant ____ Catholic 
Greek Orthodox Other: 
Jewish 
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APPENDIX B 
DECISION POWER INDEX 
In every family somebody has to decide such things 
as where the family will live and so on. Many couples talk 
things over first, but the final decision often has to be 
made by the husband or the wife. Please answer the following 
questions as accurately as possible by checking one of the 
five responses. 
WHO USUALLY MAKES THE PINAL DECISION ABOUT . . . 
1 .  . . .  w h a t  c a r  t o  g e t ?  
husband always 
_______ husband more than wife 
husband and wife exactly the same 
______ wife more than husband 
wife always 
2 .  . . .  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t o  b u y  s o m e  l i f e  i n s u r a n c e ?  
husband always 
______ husband more than wife 
_______ husband and wife exactly the same 
wife more than husband 
______ wife always 
3 .  . . .  w h a t  h o u s e  o r  a p a r t m e n t  t o  t a k e ?  
_____ husband always 
______ husband more than wife 
_____ husband and wife exactly the same 
________ wife more than husband 
______ wife always 
4 .  . . .  w h a t  j o b  t h e  husband should take? 
husband always 
_____ husband more than wife 
_______ husband and wife exactly the same 
______ wife more than husband 
_______ wife always 
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5 *  . . .  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  wife should go to work or 
quit work? 
_______ husband always 
husband more than wife 
_______ husband and wife exactly the same 
______ wife more than husband 
wife always 
6 .  . . .  h o w  m u c h  m o n e y  y o u r  f a m i l y  c a n  a f f o r d  t o  s p e n d  
per week on food? 
husband always 
husband more than wife 
______ husband and wife exactly the same 
wife more than husband 
_____ wife always 
7 .  . . .  w h a t  d o c t o r  t o  h a v e  w h e n  s o m e o n e  i s  s i c k ?  
______ husband always 
______ husband more than wife 
_____ husband and wife exactly the same 
_____ wife more than husband 
______ wife always 
8 .  . . .  w h e r e  t o  g o  o n  a  h o l i d a y  o u t i n g ?  
_____ husband always 
______ husband more than wife 
_____ husband and wife exactly the same 
_____ wife more than husband 
______ wife always 
9 .  . . .  w h e n  s e x u a l  r e l a t i o n s  w i l l  o c c u r ?  
husband always 
husband more than wife 
husband and wife exactly the same 
wife more than husband 
wife always 
10. . . . what T. V. program to watch in the evening? 
_____ husband always 
_____ husband more than wife 
_____ husband and wife exactly the same 
_____ wife more than husband 
_____ wife always 
86 
11. ... whether and/or when the children will have 
music or dancing lessons? 
husband always 
_______ husband more than wife 
________ husband and wife exactly the same 
______ wife more than husband 
_____ wife always 
12. . . . where your family will spend your vacation? 
_____ husband always 
_____ husband more than wife 
_____ husband and wife exactly the same 
_____ wife more than husband 
_____ wife always 
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RISK-TAKING DECISION 
Let's assume that Mr. is assured of a 
lifetime job in his present position, with a modest, 
though adequate, pension upon retirement. On the other 
hand it is very unlikely that his salary will increase 
much before he retires. Recently he was offered a job 
with a small, newly founded company with a highly uncertain 
future. The new position would pay considerably more to 
start and would offer the possibility of a share in the 
ownership if the company survived the competition of the 
larger competitors. 
Listed below are several probabilities or odds of 
the new company's proving financially sound. Please check 
the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable 
to make it worthwhile for him (you) to take the new job. 
(Note: the lowest probability on the list is "1 in 10"J 
_The chances are 1 in 10 that the company will 
prove financially sound. 
__The chances are 2 in 10 that the company will 
prove financially sound. 
__The chances are 3 i" 10 that the company will 
prove financially sound. 
_The chances are h in 10 that the company will 
prove financially sound. 
_The chances are 5 in 10 that the company will 
prove financially sound. 
_The chances are 6 in 10 that the company will 
prove financially sound. 
_The chances are 7 in 10 that the company will 
prove financially sound. 
_The chances are 8 in 10 that the company will 
prove financially sound. 
10) 
9) 
8) 
7)  
6 )  
5)  
4) 
3) 
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The chances are 9 in 10 that the company will (2) 
prove financially sound. 
He should not take the new job no matter what ( 1 )  
the probabilities. 
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HUSBAND-WIFE RESPONSE TO PRETEST FORM 
You indicated that the new job offer would be acceptable 
to you if the chances of the new company's success were 
Your spouse indicated that the new job offer would be 
acceptable to him her if the chances of the new company's 
success were 
